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The coordination could be centralized, as when a factory
owner manages operations, or spontaneous, as when skat-
ers weave in and out, creating order on a rink. The skaters
take conscious actions (avoiding collisions if possible) but
do not consciously create the overall order. It just emerges
as if orchestrated by, yes, an invisible hand. Whether the
coordination concerns a skating rink or a liberal economy,
there must be—or we must imagine—some “beholder
and judge” whose invisible hand oversees it on moral as
well as pragmatic grounds (p. 45).
The author cites a passage from Smith’s earlier Theory
of Moral Sentiments that eerily foreshadows his famous
invisible hand quotation from the Wealth of Nations (p. 34):
“ ‘[B]y acting according to the dictates of our moral facul-
ties we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for
promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore
be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity and to
advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.’”
The case for a liberal economy rests on our belief that
some allegorical judge and beholder approves it.
Klein uses the distinction between concatenate and
mutual coordination to counter some objections to the
invisible hand. With the rise of game theory, economists
usually think of coordination as mutual and fail to find it
in a market economy. For example, Joseph Stiglitz cannot
find mutual coordination among steel producers, so rejects
the invisible hand (pp. 75–76). But the invisible hand,
Klein reminds us, rests on concatenate coordination, coor-
dinating conflict as well as cooperation from above, and
does not depend on participants’ mutual coordination.
Admitting a role for moral judgment does not absolve
Klein from substantiating the case for free markets. He
provides examples, but few seem convincing. For exam-
ple, he argues for “free competition” in urban transit—
not only among bus, taxi, and limo services but train lines
as well. Who decides where the tracks are laid? And, since
urban planners “can well argue” that partial privatization
could yield “disjointed pieces, destructive competition and
interloping” (p. 166), the author goes all out for privatiz-
ing streets, sidewalks, even local governance (p. 170). Prag-
matic regulation might be necessary, he concedes, such as
blocking whoever owns the street in front of Bill Gates’s
house from extorting “outrageous payments” from him
(pp. 173–74). What about the owners of streets in front
of others’ houses? All urban streets are monopolies. How
is this whole fantastic concatenation to work concretely?
Klein could analyze experiences. Governments have pri-
vatized everything from highways to airport security (not
a notable success on 9/11). What went right; what went
wrong? He coauthored an article discussing the “great con-
catenations of turnpike infrastructures” that private build-
ers laid in the nineteenth century. How well did they
succeed? Why did governments take them over?
Like colleagues such as George Akerlof and Joseph
Stiglitz, Basu deploys the neoclassical paradigm to tell alle-
gories about how the invisible hand fails. Contrary to the
subtitle’s claim, his is not a “new economics.” More impor-
tant, if a paradigm is so easily contorted—if assuming a
few imperfect deviations from its underlying framework
will yield opposite results—why rely on it at all?
Klein’s case for the invisible hand, resting ultimately on
moral grounds, is uncontorted and direct. But since, like
Smith, he concedes that pragmatic exceptions to the free-
market ideal will always apply, what rationale underlies
these exceptions? And why should we believe that the
invisible hand works when they do not apply? It is hard to
conceive an argument that would persuade skeptics or
dissuade believers.
Knowledge and Coordination can be rough going because
Klein often fails to define subtle terms clearly enough and
then keeps circling back to remedy what he left muddy.
These obstacles aside, the book should give serious pause
to economists and political scientists who too readily posit
a theoretical optimal world and then too credulously think
that they can model the actual world by elaborating “imper-
fect” twists on it. Basu’s more readable book uses some of
the tools Klein dislikes but, in the stronger arguments,
makes intuitive sense. Beyond the Invisible Hand will be
useful to political economists who want to see how game
theory can shed light on the ways that groups and races of
rational actors may assume surprising dynamics. It could
also be useful to policymakers who must justify argu-
ments about group policies in standard economic terms.
Both authors’ contributions to political economy deserve
to be taken seriously.
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This book tackles the paradoxical revival of nationalism in
an age in which national boundaries are being lowered in
the process of European integration. Most of Illiberal Pol-
itics in Neoliberal Times analyzes one particular case, that
of France, and offers a new interpretation of the rise of the
Front National. In analyzing the party’s origins, Mabel
Berezin first reminds us of the significant role of anticom-
munism and the rejection of 1968 in the Front National’s
early discourse. This is important because the rise of the
extreme populist Right all too often is analyzed only in
terms of the salience of the immigration issue. Immigra-
tion indeed became important in the 1980s and early
1990s. Increasingly, however, Berezin argues, “Europe” has
replaced it as the main issue driving support for the extreme
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To substantiate her argument, Berezin centers her analy-
sis on the Front National’s discourse and the broader con-
text in which the party became one of the most successful
of its type in Europe. This perspective allows her to make
the provocative—but largely convincing—claim that the
Front National’s setback in the 2007 presidential elec-
tions, rather than revealing the short-term antiestablish-
ment nature of right-wing populist mobilization, was
actually a paradox of success: The Front National had
transformed the discourse in French political society, which
contributed to Nicolas Sarkozy’s winning of the presi-
dency with a toned-down version of the populist Right’s
discourse.
To systematize the analysis, the author divides the tra-
jectory of the Front National and its impact on French
society into five time periods. The first phase is “ascend-
ance,” during which the extreme Right’s first electoral show-
ings were met with protest by organizations such as SOS
Racisme. While the Left governed France, the party’s her-
itage as a countermovement against communism and 1968
was still very visible. The next phase, “mobilization,”
spanned 1995–97. While the Gaullists governed and imple-
mented neoliberal reforms, the Front National managed
to broaden its support. “Banalization” is characterized by
success and defeat. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s speeches came to
focus increasingly on European integration. But the party’s
split in 1999 gave pause to its rise. Le Pen’s spectacular
comeback in the 2002 presidential elections, which marked
the end of the fourth phase (“climbing back,” 2000–
2002), came as a surprise to many. Ultimately, in the last
phase, “dédiabolisation,” the Front National came very
close to representing ideas that by now have become main-
stream. It is not so much that the party has become main-
stream. Rather, the mainstream has increasingly come to
resemble the Front National.
In methodological terms, events “that marked turning
points in collective national perceptions” (p. 11) form the
unit of analysis. Events are deemed important because
they condition what happens later in a path-dependent
manner. As stated further along in the book, they “serve as
templates of possibilities and sites of collective evaluation.
[They] may alter collective national perceptions as well as
generate powerful emotions” (p. 199). The “events” stud-
ied in the book include the party’s initial breakthrough in
the early 1980s, the Strasbourg convention that defined
the party as “Neither Right Nor Left: French,” the 2002
presidential elections when Le Pen came in second, and
the French “No” to the European Union constitution in
2005.
Although perhaps not as radical a departure from prior
treatments of the Front National as suggested in Chap-
ter 2, particularly not from the French literature, the
author’s culturalist approach illuminates several phenom-
ena that many studies have missed. One example is the
Front National’s appropriation of Labor Day as a nation-
alist holiday (Chapter 5). The book thereby contributes to
our understanding of the way in which the extreme Right
succeeded in rallying the working class throughout West-
ern Europe, an empirical fact lacking a convincing expla-
nation. By showing how the Front National attacks
neoliberalism, Berezin also corrects the market-liberal image
sometimes attributed to the populist Right. Second, the
author’s analysis of events reveals the Front National’s sur-
prisingly strong emphasis on the challenge to national
sovereignty posed by European integration and the larger
process of globalization since the late 1990s. Because
Europe has rarely been an important issue in election cam-
paigns, it has tended to be discarded as one of the extreme
Right’s prime issues—a mistake, it seems. Election cam-
paigns are special events, when challenging parties are at
the mercy of the major players in the party system in
shaping the terms of the debate.
As to cross-national differences, Berezin argues that the
challenge posed by European integration and globaliza-
tion differs depending on what she calls “consolidation
regimes” (pp. 49–54). This term describes the relation-
ship between national culture and the polity, or between
the nation and the state. Hegemonic consolidation regimes
are characterized by a strong state (which mainly denotes
an institutionalized parliamentary democracy, and thus
does not vary across advanced industrial countries) and a
nationalized culture. This type, exemplified by France, is
vulnerable to external threats. Flexible consolidation
regimes, one of the other two possible types, are internally
less coherent, but “externally more flexible and much more
able than hegemonic consolidation regimes to respond to
external threats or exogenous factors” (p. 51). In the last
chapter before the conclusion, France is contrasted to the
Italian case, an example of a country with a flexible con-
solidation regime. It is only here that this part of the ana-
lytical framework really becomes relevant. Indeed, all
components of the Italian Right share a firm commitment
to Europe, and Europe is seen as an opportunity rather
than a threat. But it seems difficult to attribute the differ-
ences in the divisiveness of Europe exclusively to France’s
cultural monism as opposed to Italy’s cultural pluralism.
Berezin herself highlights how the mainstreaming of the
Alleanza Nazionale was shaped by the breakdown of the
first Italian republic’s party system.
While the book is stimulating, it would have benefited
from a stronger engagement with the literature on the
extreme Right and the transformation of West European
party systems. The wholesale rejection of existing research
based on a rather cursory discussion in five pages (pp. 40–
45) is unsatisfactory. Indeed, the depiction of the Front
National’s early profile seems quite compatible with Piero
Ignazi’s influential claim that the extreme populist Right
represents a “silent counterrevolution” against parties mobi-
lizing on postmaterialist values. For Berezin, however, post-
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alignments, not the formation of new divides that may be
related to the extreme populist Right’s mobilization and
that can result in new alignments. It seems unfortunate
that the works of Herbert Kitschelt, Hans-Georg Betz,
and Ignazi are unduly reduced to political economy expla-
nations. Berezin thereby neglects accounts that analyze
the extreme right in terms of the party system dynamics of
the past three decades. Consequently, she assumes that the
“reassertion of the nation” (p. 218) encompasses all seg-
ments of the French public, when we know that the elec-
torate of the New Left is staunchly cosmopolitan (though
possibly antimarket).
Despite these minor criticisms, however, Illiberal Poli-
tics in Neoliberal Times is well worth reading. It represents
a significant contribution to our understanding of the Front
National phenomenon in France that has fascinated so
many scholars.
Care Work and Class: Domestic Workers’ Struggle
for Equal Rights in Latin America. By Merike Blofield.
University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2012. 200p. $64.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592712002939
— Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, University of New Mexico
In Care Work and Class, Merike Blofield offers a powerful
corrective to the persistent invisibility of domestic
workers—one the most important sectors for female
employment in Latin America—in existing labor and Latin
American studies. In this empirically-rich study of how
and why formally democratic states have recently passed
important legislation to protect the labor rights of domes-
tic workers, Blofield also makes a passionate normative
case for ending legal discrimination against domestic work-
ers throughout the region. Blofield’s research is particu-
larly timely, charting as it does the paths to reform and
enforcement of new laws in four countries (Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Uruguay and Chile) and the 2011 International
Labor Organization convention on domestic service. Fur-
ther, Blofield’s approach allows her to address the politics
of economic inequality throughout the region, arguing
that “how the state mediates this power relation [between
employers and domestic workers]—in terms of both laws
and enforcement—is an indicator of how the state bal-
ances the interests of the rich versus the poor in a democ-
racy (4).” In addition to compiling comparative data on
domestic workers’ status in constitutional, labor, and judi-
cial codes, Blofield works with congressional debates and
interviews to show the economic and cultural reasons for
legislative and employer resistance to allowing state inter-
vention in domestic service relations. In light of the leg-
islative resistance and indifference that doomed many
earlier reform attempts, Blofield shows how successful
legislative projects depend on reformists’ ability to push
the laws to a plenary congressional vote, where politi-
cians are loathe to declare their opposition publicly. If it
did nothing else—and it does much more—Care Work
and Class would be important for the way it demon-
strates how public opinion on matters of persistent, struc-
tural inequality can make a difference, by shifting the
political calculus of elected officials and thereby propel-
ling new legislation that generates real improvements in
domestic workers’ working conditions, salaries, mater-
nity and hour limits.
In an effort to balance the specific circumstances of her
selected cases with a regional view of domestic service
reform, Blofield structures Care Work and Class around
two approaches to the topic: exploring efforts to reform
and enforce equal rights legislation in broad regional terms,
and documenting the path to reform in four national cases.
In the book’s opening chapters, Blofield mines a wealth of
regional statistics to describe the working conditions, leg-
islative battles, and enforcement challenges related to
domestic service in the twentieth century. Here Blofield
draws widely on existing historical and sociological stud-
ies to sketch how ethnic and gender inequalities have been
articulated in domestic service relations, stressing the near
impossibility of effective redress of domestic workers’ griev-
ances prior to the recent wave of reform. While her nar-
rative examination of disparate efforts in multiple countries
renders the story somewhat opaque, Blofield’s tables on
domestic workers’ employment, salaries, and work hours,
as well as those charting relevant legislation and reform
efforts, are an absolutely indispensible tool for researchers
wishing to place their own work in regional or compara-
tive context. Moreover, this approach exposes the concen-
tration of successful reform efforts in the last fifteen years,
providing compelling evidence for Blofield’s central argu-
ment linking equality reform with the political circum-
stances of post-authoritarian rule in Latin America.
Care Work and Class is at its best in two chapters
describing the disparate paths to legislative reform taken
by domestic worker advocates in four countries, which
supply excellent evidence for Blofield’s conclusion that
“domestic workers’ organizations, a network of social and
political allies, and political ‘windows of opportunity’ ”
(40) are necessary to achieve positive outcomes. Blofield’s
detailed reconstruction of these trajectories through con-
gressional records and original interviews reveals the highly
personal and repetitive nature of arguments against reform:
opponents frequently cite their concern to protecting
domestic workers’ real interests (access to employment)
and stress the importance of maintaining informal, pater-
nalistic arrangements they consider unique to domestic
service. Particularly striking here is the frequency with
which reform opponents, as well as advocates, recur to
personal experience (usually, but not always, as employ-
ers of domestic workers) to support their views. Accord-
ing to Blofield, personal experience is a more powerful
indicator of a legislator’s position on reform than is ide-
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